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In The Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
RELIANCE NATIONAL LIFE INSUR-
;\N(;E COMPANY, 
Plain tiff-Respondent, 
- vs -
JAMES E. CAINE, dba CAINE AGENCY 
Defendant-Appellant'. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
Case No. 
10940 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This ts an action for moneys allegedly ad-
vanced, moneys collected and not paid to Respon-
dent Insurance Company by Appellant Caine, and 
related miscellaneous charges which Respondent 
claimed were due him from the Appellant in 
the sum of $6,762.73, after deducting all credits due 
Appellant from Respondent, and which arose from 
ri. life insurance agency contract between the parties 
herein. Appellant's counterclaim is an action for an 
uccounting, which Respondent has not furnished 
tc Appellant, although such was provided for in the 
written contract between the parties, to deter-
mine the amounts due Appellant from Respondent. 
In conjunction with such accounting, and its de-
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termination, it was necessary for the court to 
determine any breaches of this contract, and which 
party was responsible therefore. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LO\A.TER COURT 
The case was tried to the Court. From a judq-
ment for the Respondent in the sum of $6,762.73 
Appellant appeals. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks a reversal of the decision oi 
the court in whole, or in part, in awarding this 
money judgment on the grounds that there is no 
evidence anywhere in the record to sustain this 
judgment and there is no evidence to support the 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law made by 
the court. Appellant also seeks to have the case 
remanded to the lower court for further considera· 
tion of the evidence referred to, but never com-
pleted nor submitted, or in the alternative, for a new 
trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Frank B. Salisbury, president of Responder.t 
company, became acquainted with James E. Caine, 
a life insurance salesman, in December 1955 and 
negotiated a written contract with him, dated Feb· 
ruary 1, 1956 wherein Caine was hired as Agency 
Supervisor for Reliance Life Insurance Company, 
hereafter referred to as Reliance (Exh. P-1). The con-
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tract was written by Mr. Salisb1Jry, and contained 
] 9 provisions, of which two are of vital interest hern, 
together with testimony that an accounting to Caine 
was mandatory in order to enable him to know the 
extent of his earnings, because of the complicated 
nature of this insurance company's records. (R 142, 
143). 
The agreement continued until late July or early 
August 1956 at which time a series of charges and 
counter-charges and recriminations between Salis-
bury and Ca_ine resulted, on August 20th, 1956 with 
Mr. Caine resigning from all of his duties v.rith Re-
liance (Exh. P-3). The resignation was accepted, and 
Caine was next heard from later that year in Nevada 
where he set up an Insurance company. At lhe time 
Caine left Reliance, or shortly thereafter, seven 
agents of Reliance also left the company (R 75). 
Some of them apparently joined Caine, in Nevada, 
others did not. (R 88, 111, 112, 113). One employee of 
Reliance testified that he had heard Caine, before 
August 20th, 1956, mention to a group of salesmen 
"that there was money in Nevada, no Blue Sky law," 
and some comment about starting a company there. 
(R 92). Another employee testified that each agent 
received a statement each month from Reliance 
concerning his accounts, and that Caine had never 
complained that his statements were incorrect (R 
145). One of the seven agents who reportedly left 
the company when Caine did testified that he re-
siqned at least three weeks before Caine did be-
cause Salisbury, president of Reliance kept cutting 
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down his salary, and over-writes, or both when he 
made too much money, telling him, "You are mak-
ing more than the President of the company." 
(R 135). This agent, a Mr. Dedmore, admitted that he 
later went to work for Caine, in Navada and else-
where, but denied that he was ever solicited b11 
Caine before quitting Reliance. (R 82, 83) 
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At the end of the August 20th, 1956 trial, the at-
torney for Reliance stated he was going to submit 
a deposition from a Mr. Mortensen, concerning the 
going into business in Nevada and then wanted tc 
meet with Caine's counsel to prepare a few inter-
rogatories on the special issues to be found from 
the evidence. (R 166). 
Of interest is the fact that nowhere in this 110 
page transcript of the .August 20th trial are any ref-
erences to the commissions due Caine, or the ad-
vances due back to Reliance, nor is such contained 
in any of the five exhibits admitted in evidence at 
the trial. nor in the other two exhibits proposed by 
Caine, but not offered (R 24). 
Also of interest is that the deposition of Mr. 
Mortensen, taken by Reliance on August 22, 1960, 
was nowhere ever offered in evidence, nor ordered 
opened by the Court and published. (R ____ __). An-
other deposition, of one Joseph Ashton Cosby, was 
never taken with notice to the Court, was never of-
fered in evidence, nor ordered opened by the Courl 
and published. However, each of these depositions. 
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according to the Register of Writs book were open-
ed. Too, they were considered by the Court and the 
counsel for the parties. (R_ ______ J 
Caine has endeavored to bring to the Supreme 
Court, in this appeal, the total record for the Court's 
information to determine whether the Memorandum 
Decision of the Judge of the lower court, and the 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judge-
ment are supported by the evidence and the record. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONSIDERING 
THE TWO DEPOSITIONS IN ITS DECISION, AND THE 
TESTIMONIES GIVEN THEREIN, BECAUSE OF ITS 
FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH RULE 30, UTAH RULES 
OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, WHICH PERTAINS TO DEPO-
SITIONS UPON ORAL EXAMINATION. 
Rule 30 (f) (1), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
states in part that the officer who swears in the wit-
ness and certifies concerning the deposition "shall 
then securely seal the deposition in an envelope 
indorsed with the title of the action and marked 
"Deposition of (the witness)" and shall promptly 
file it with the court in which the action is pendino 
or send it by registered mail to the clerk thereof for 
filing." 
According to the Register of Actions Book these 
Depositions of August 8 and August 22, 1960 were 
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not r~ceived by the Court until January 5th, 1961, 
and they were "not sealed" according to the entry 
of such Register. (R _________ __). 
Further, it has been the time-honored procedure 
in Utah Courts that after being sealed, the deposi-
tion shall be opened only by order of the Court, 
or by the Court's direction. Ordinarily, it is not per-
missible to open a deposition out of court, and b 
do so may render it inadmissable for all purposes. 
23 Am. Jur 2d, "Depositions," (84). If the trial court 
received and read these two depositions, counsel 
for each party should have had an opportunity to re-
but, clarify, or challenge such testimony. Nothing in 
the record indicates whether this was done. On the 
basis of the trial transcript alone, there seems to be 
no preponderance of the evidence that Caine per· 
suaded any of Reliance's agents to quit, or to have 
any assured's cancel their policies with Reliance, 
which would have invoked the forfeiture clause in 
Caine's contract. If the depositions were used to ad-
vise the Court in this regard, there is no indication 
of it anywhere in the record. These depositions were 
taken after the trial of August 1st, 1960, but appar-
ently were referred to in some later hearing or meet· 
ing before the Court, although the Clerk of the Court 
did not receive them until January 5th, 1961. (R ----- _). 
In Defendant's Statement of Case, dated November 
23, 1960, he refers to the deposition of Mr. Cosby 
and points out certain weaknesses in the testimony 
he gave (R 29). He also plays down the depositioi1 
statements of Mr. Mortenson as relates to C1)ne hav 
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ing persuaded him to quit his job with Reliance. 
(R 30). 
The counsel for Reliance, in Plaintiff's State-
ment of Case, also dated November 23, 1960, also 
referred to Mr. Cosby's deposition (R 33) in con-
tending that Caine induced the agents to leave Re- · 
liance. 
Perhaps counsel for each side used the infor-
mation in the depositions referred to, without knowl-
edge of the trial court; or perhaps they were used 
in conjunction with some hearing before the Court, 
or maybe they were properly ordered published by 
th8 Court. The point is, there is nothing in the record 
to indicate what if anything, was done in this re-
gard, and this was error. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING 
JUDGMENT AGAINST CAINE FOR $6,762. WITH NO 
ACCOUNTING RECORDS, NO TESTIMONY AS TO 
THE CONCLUSION REACHED, AND NO EVIDENCE 
OF ANY TYPE, KIND OR DESCRIPTION AS TO HOW 
THIS MONEY JUDGMENT WAS DETERMINED. 
There is no information in the transcript of the 
trial of August 1st, 1956 to indicate how the trial 
court determined that Caine owed Reliance $6,762. 
There are no accounting records, nor statements, 
anywhere in the file of the case, nor indicated in 
the Register of Actions Book that any evidence was 
ever offered or received in support of this amount, 
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or any other sum. 
In the Defendant's Statement of Case, dated 
November 23, 1960 and flled with the Court on Jan-
uary 5, 1961, Caine's former counsel contends that 
an audit by a C.P.A. firm indicated that $8,42l .76 
was owed to the defendant Caine from Reliance, 
"based uoon defendant's interpretation of the exis1-
ing contracts." (R 27 & 28). 
In Plaintiff's Statement of Case, also dated No-
vember 23. and filed Januarv 5 the followin0 
year, the counsel for Reliance stated that it had in-
troduced its records into evidence showing tha~ 
Caine owed Reliance $6,762, but adds, however, 
"The a_udit of defendant's (Caine) account with 
plaintiff (Relia.nce) f-urnished by Richmond, Jones E 
Anderson shows that plaintiff is indebted to de-
fendant. Counsel for Reliance then picks out fivP 
statements in the C.P.A. accour.tinq under discus-
sion to show it is not as accurate as that of the in-
surance company. He also refers to a "Schedule 2 
0.tk_ched" to explain huw the commission was com-
puted. Ho\flrever, there is no Schedule 2 attached, 
nor any other schedule. (R 33, 34 & 35). Nor is there 
anvthing in the record to indicate that such sched 
ul~ was ever submitted, or submitted and with-
drawn. 
POINT III 
WHEN THERE IS NO COMPETENT EVIDENCE 
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TN A LAW CASE TO WARRANT THE FINDINGS OF 
FACT AND DECISION, THE SUPREME COURT MAY 
INTERFERE AND HOLD THE FINDINGS AND DE-
\ISION VOID. 
Rule 72 (a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states 
that an appeal in an equity case may be on ques-
tions of both law and fact. In cases at law, the appeal 
shall be on questions of law only. However, the con-
clusiveness of verdicts and findings is always open 
to review. by the Supreme Court, if the findings and 
judgment are not supported by the evidence. And, 
if the findings or judgment are so manifestly er-
roneous as to indicate oversight, or mistake, which 
affects the substantial rights of the appellant, the 
Supreme Court has full power to set aside such 
judgment. McKay v. Farr, 15 Utah 261, 49 Pac. 649 
1897. Klopenstine vs. Hays, 20 Utah 45, 57 Pac. 712, 
1899. Elliot vs. Whitmore, 23 Utah 342, 65 Pac. 70, 
1901. 90 Am. St. Rep. 700. 
Our Supreme Court has held in other law cases 
thi'\t when there is no competent evidence to war-
rant a finding of fact which materially affects rights 
of litigant, that the Suoreme Court will interfere and 
hold the finding nugatory and void. Whittaker vs. 
Ferguson, 16 Utah 240, 51 Pac 980, 1898. Especially 
so where there is entire absence of supporting 
proof, as in the instant case, relating to the $6,762. 
judgment. Wild v. Union Pacific R. Co., 23 Utah 265, 
63 P. 886, 1901. 
In the case of Jensen vs. Howell, 75 Utah 64, 282 
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Pac. 1034, 1929, our Supreme Court reversed the 
findings of a trial court where it was manifest tha.t 
the findings were so clearly against the weight of 
evidence as to indicate a misconception, or not a 
due consideration of it. In other Utah cases, such as 
In Re Yowell's Estate., 75 Utah 312, 285 Pac. 28.S, 
1930, for example, our Supreme Court has rightly 
held that it will not interfere in such cases unless 
the findings are so manifestly against the clear 
weight of evidence as to indicate it was not fairly 
or impartially considered by the Court below, or 
that portions of it were arbitrarily rejected or disre-
garded, or that undue weight was given other por-
tions of the evidence, or that the trial court miscon-
ceived or misapplied the evidence, or was influ-
enced through prejudice or bias. However, in the 
entire absence of supporting proof, the Court is free 
to examine, not only the evidence, but the entire 
record. (Whittaker case supra). 
In the instant case there is some novelty be-
cause of the extent of time from the commencement 
of this action by Reliance in October 1956 to the one-
day trial August 1st, 1960. There are tvventy entries 
prior to the trial date, as shown in the Register of 
Actions book which indicates diligence on the part 
of the advocates of the causes. There are approxi-
mately fifteen additional entries in the Register of 
Actions Book commencing after the trial date of 
August 1st, 1960 to and including the present time. 
(R ). On March 21st, 1966, Judge Hanson again 
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continued the case for further hearing, without date. 
When counsel for the parties met with the Court on 
March 21st, 1966, it was noted then that the record 
was incomplete. Neither the trial court Judge nor 
his court reporter could find entries of other hear-
~ngs, or of evidence, or documents submitted after 
a diligent search of their own records. However, no 
further action was taken by either side and in Apnl, 
1967, counsel for Mr. Caine filed a motion to re-
open the case or to permit him to file Final Papers 
in:ismuch as counsel for Reliance had failed to do 
so. A few days after filing the Motion, counsel for 
Reliance filed the Judgment, Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law herein. (R 47, 48, 49,50, 51 & 52). 
From these Findings and Judgment the appeal was 
taken bv counsel for Caine in May, 1967. 
Appellant Caine does not contend that there 
w:is bics. fraud nor discrimination by the Court in 
this matter but does contend that the evidence and 
rE:cords needed to uphold the Findings and the 
Judgment are absent as supporting proof. Because 
of this fact and a hesita.ncy by both parties and the 
Cour1 to go forward with additional hearings, be-
cause of the incomplete record, it is believed by 
the Appellant, at leas+, that a review of the matter 
by the?- SuDreme Court and its subsequent directive 
or order would enable this action to be concluded 
in lhe foreseeable future, one way or the other. 
In 5 Am Jur 2d, "Appeal and Error" paragraph 
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841 is laid down the general principle that a finding 
of fact will be not be supported on appeal if it is 
clearly against the weight or the preponderance of 
the evidence, or if it is not supported by any "sub-
stantial" evidence, or is clearly erroneous, or not 
supported by any reasonable view, taken of the 
evidence. Cited in support of this view are num-
erous cases including Jackson vs. Jackson, 201 Okla 
292, 205 P 2d 297 (1949) and Mugaas vs. Smith, 33 
Wash 2d 429, 206 P 2d 332 (1949). Also cited in sup-
port of this proposition is Van Voast vs. Blaine Coun· 
ty, 118 Mont 395, 167 P 2d 572 (1946) and Dillard v. 
McKnight, 34 Cal 2d 209, 209 P 2d 387. A Washing-
ton case, Lassiter vs. Guy F. Atkinson Company, (CA 
9 Wash) 176 F 2d 984 (1949) held that, If, on the entire 
evidence, the appellate court is left with the definite 
and firm conviction that a mistake has been commit-
ted, it has the duty to reverse the trial court's finding. 
The discussion in Am Jur further states than an ap-
pellate court always has the power to examine 
whether the Findings of Fact of the Court below are 
supported by competent evidence. If it is not, it will 
set aside the judgment of the trial judge where the 
facts as determined by him fail to support his legal 
conclusions drawn from them. In support of this 
case is Italian-American Bank vs. Carosella, 81 Colo 
214, 254 Pac 771 (1927). 
In his Defendant's Statement of Case, dated No-
vember 23rd, 1960, the then counsel for Caine 
stated "no evidence was introduced by either side 
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touching _upon the amount owed by or to either 
party." (R 27). In the same Statement of November 
23rd, counsel for defendant Caine states that when 
certain questions have been determined by the 
Court, that within ten days plaintiff would provide 
the defendant with a statement of account, based 
upon the rulings of the court. (R 32). The parties, 
in a five page stipulation of the same date, joined 
in asking the Court to rule on certain questions 
after which Reliance, within ten days, would pro-
vide Caine with a statement of accounts based on 
the rulings of the court. 
However, the trial judge either overlooked or 
ignored the request of counsel for both parties to 
have certain questions determined by the Court 
and issued his memorandum decision on January 
5, 1961. The substance of this decision was later in-
corporated into the Findings and the Judgment of 
the Court. (R 25 & 26: 47-52). The Findings and Judg-
ment provided for the $6,672 award to Reliance, in-
voked the forfeiture provision and stated that any 
prior breach by Reliance would not bar the appli-
cation of such forfeiture provision. Of note is the 
fact that the judge relies on the "Depositions sub-
mitted with the statements of the parties" in reach-
ing his decision. (R 25). In his decision the Court re-
quired that Reliance pay the costs of the accounting 
work done, because it had never been completed 
and furnished to Cain, as required by the contract 
but no amount was set out by the judge in his de-
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cision although the findings and judgment set up 
the sum of $675 which had been determined as due 
and owing to the date of the August 1st, 1960 trial 
for accounting services, but which were not yet 
complete as of that time because of the need to have 
certain questions determined by the Court. (R 48 
50, 51, 166). At the August 1st. 1960 trial, the judg~ 
proposed $695. as a reasonable accounting fee. (R 
166). 
CONCLUSION 
If one consults the Register of Actions Book or 
any other part of the Record here, there is no testi-
mony, evidence nor exhibits indicated to sustain 
this money judgment against Caine for the sum ol 
$6,762.73. 
If one refers to the transcript of the trial, in and 
of itself, it is highly doubtful whether the evidence 
therein and testimony given warrants the invoking 
of the forfeiture provision of Caine's contract with 
Reliance. The Judge in his Memorandum Decision 
rl2ced emphasis on the testimony from the two 
depositions which were persuasive to him that the 
forfeiture clause should be applied. Caine contends 
that nowhere in the Record is there any indication 
that either or both of these depositions were proper-
ly authenticated, introduced nor rebutted, nor was 
he provided the opportunity to discredit these depo-
sitions. 
In the event that the testimony given at the 
trial justifies invoking the forfeiture clause, clarifica-
15 
tion is needed as to when and whether commissions 
Caine had earned, but not been paid, up to the time 
of his resignation would still be due and owing to 
h1m. Because these matters are not supported by the 
preponderance of the evidence and because of the 
total lack of accounting records to provide the basis 
for any money judgment, and because these depo-
s1 t1ons, according to the record were never intro-
duced, properly or otherwise, this cause should be 
reversed, or remanded, or a new trial ordered. In 
the alternative the trial court should be directed to 
cure the record of the August 1, 1960 trial, and per-
mit the parties to properly introduce the evidence 
and records needed to determine what relief should 
be given to Caine and Reliance, or either, and to 
clarify the previous decision of the trial court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
MERRILL K. DA VIS 
72 East Fourth South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Defendant-
Appellant 
